The Gentrification of Human Rights by Fagan, Andrew








This article addresses what is increasingly perceived as a crisis of human rights. 
While contemporary critiques of human rights address a diverse set of challenges 
and issues, this article focuses specifically on the "populist" demagogic challenge to 
human rights within those notionally liberal-democratic societies in which human 
rights have been typically considered most secure. While agreeing with those who 
have argued that human rights is in crisis, in part, because of its relationship with 
neoliberalism, this article goes beyond this argument and outlines a way of 
understanding that relationship through identifying what I term the "gentrification of 
human rights." This article outlines the concept of the gentrification of human rights, 
while also seeking to demonstrate how gentrification restricts the ability of human 
rights to engage robustly with rising deprivation, inequality, and marginalization 
within affluent, "liberal-democratic" societies. It also presents some of the key 
challenges that confront human rights. 
 
"A very popular error: having the courage of one's convictions; rather it is a matter of 
having the courage for an attack on one's convictions." 
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I. HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRISIS: NON-ACADEMIC CHALLENGES 
 
There is an ongoing trend within academic human rights circles that depicts the so-
called, and much celebrated, "age of human rights" as giving way to a state of crisis. 
Other human rights academics dispute this depiction and remain optimistic about the 
capacity of human rights to realize its promise. Human rights optimists point to the 
existence of a robust and comprehensive body of international human rights law and 
also point to the apparent weaknesses and contradictions of the pessimists' 
arguments.1 If the fate of human rights was entirely dependent upon resolving 
academic debate and argument, those who support human rights would have little 
cause for concern. In the expectation that I am likely to receive a similar response to 
that meted out to the pessimists who come before me, I nevertheless contend that 
human rights is, indeed, in real trouble. 
 
One of the most serious threats to human rights comes not from disillusioned, 
pessimistic scholars lamenting yet another failed "god," but rather from sections of 
the electorate within many societies in which, what I shall refer to as demagoguery, 
(rather than populism), is on the rise.2 While demagoguery does not speak for "the 
people" in their entirety (which political platform could ever really achieve that?), it 
undoubtedly constitutes a grave and serious threat to what has typically been 
referred to as a liberal-democratic order within a growing number of societies. Widely 
lauded as the dominant political idiom of our age, human rights has been a core 
component of this liberal order for several decades.3 It comes as little surprise, then, 
that a concerted challenge to that order should extend to include human rights. 
Indeed, "human rights" features frequently as a vaguely defined, or empty signifier in 
repeated demagogic assaults upon the liberal, rights-evoking order. Dependent as it 
is upon simplifying narratives, demagoguery has, in part, achieved its electoral and 
political successes as a consequence of its ability to characterize human rights as 
hostile to the concerns of the many "ordinary" citizens from whom demagogues seek 
to gain electorally significant support. For opponents and supporters alike, critical 
attitudes towards human rights have become emblematic of illiberalism. Through 
associating the defense of human rights with what is presented as the elitist, self-
assured attitudes of a socially and politically unrepresentative constituency of 
people, demagoguery increases its appeal and accelerates the forces that seek to 
condemn the human rights community to the status of an electorally unpopular 
minority.4 Having persistently focused on the worst atrocities perpetrated beyond the 
frontiers of a purportedly liberaldemocratic "Western" order, the human rights 
community now finds itself targeted at home, where it has often paid little attention to 
the travails of fellow citizens. Demagoguery is real enough and there seems to be 
little prospect of its imminent demise. How should the human rights community 
respond to the challenges it presently faces? This is a profoundly important question. 
How the human rights community addresses and answers this question will, I 
strongly believe, largely determine the fate of human rights in the proceeding 
decades of the twenty-first century. If the human rights community fails to critically 
engage with the growing domestic challenges that it confronts, it is highly likely that it 
will experience the same fate as that which appears to await other constituents of 
what is cast as the liberal elite; an unedifying descent into a socially exclusive, 
politically unpopular credo for a diminishing number of supporters, with ever 
diminishing influence beyond their own social enclaves. 
 
How, then, is the human rights community likely to respond to these challenges? I 
suspect, and recent reports suggest, that the standard response may only serve to 
hasten its decline. The human rights community typically does not respond well to 
criticism and critique.5 Not being entirely for human rights is often construed as 
setting oneself against human rights. In respect to the current demagogic assaults 
upon human rights, this stance may seem reasonable. After all, how can an 
individual be expected to constructively respond to, or even develop a dialogue with, 
people who are so resolutely hostile? It is easier for people to resign themselves to 
irreconcilable differences. It is easier to denounce the views of many Trump or Brexit 
supporters as "deplorable," to coin Hillary Clinton's entirely counter-productive 
phrase during the 2016 US presidential campaign.6 The views and interests of many 
such groups are fundamentally illiberal and incompatible with respect for human 
rights. As such, many human rights supporters may consider themselves duty-bound 
to reject these views and, given an enduring belief in individuals' ultimate 
responsibility for their professed views and commitments, to extend that rejection to 
those who espouse them: deplorable views become deplorable people.7 
 
However, an attack-based defense strategy is likely to be both a pragmatic mistake 
and constitute a failure to engage with deep shortcomings within the human rights 
community and the doctrine it espouses. In distinctly pragmatic terms, one might 
caution against an overly righteous dismissal of opponents' prejudices since, after 
all, these adversaries are fellow citizens and voters who are (increasingly it would 
appear) in a position to affect governments' support for human rights, both 
domestically and internationally. As Hillary Clinton discovered, some dismissive 
responses serve to lend weight to a demagogic depiction of liberals and human 
rights defenders as elitist and intolerant of those who do not espouse a similar faith 
in liberal values and norms. This depiction merely confirms the claims demagogues 
routinely make about liberals and human rights supporters being, at best, out of 
touch and aloof from more domestic, everyday concerns of many voters. Given the 
dependency of human rights upon governmental political support (however 
"symbolic" this support has typically been), a more pragmatic standpoint may merit 
some consideration. However, advocating pragmatism is not the objective of this 
article. 
 
The more significant objective of this article is to engage with the consequences for 
human rights of simply and summarily dismissing on-going criticism. Most 
importantly, this article will address how the prevailing dismissal of criticism in this 
specific area of theory and practice will prevent the community from developing an 
urgently required understanding of its deeper inability to address effectively some of 
the weightiest challenges which confront societies at risk of demagogic 
authoritarianism. Developing this selfcritical understanding will require an 
acknowledgement of (and subsequent engagement with) deep internal shortcomings 
and limitations. The on-going crisis of human rights is not merely a consequence of 
demagogues stoking their supporters' prejudices and hostilities. The human rights 
community has also contributed to the very conditions, which now pose a threat to 
the community and its doctrine. Central to the self-undermining predicament of 
human rights is, I shall argue, its relationship with neoliberal capitalism and the 
particular way in which this relationship has deeply influenced significant, if not 
constitutive, elements of the human rights community. 
 
II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND NEOLIBERAL CAPITALISM 
 
It is part of what I shall term the pernicious "genius" of capitalism that all of us who 
are exposed to its various manifestations unavoidably reproduce its commodifying 
and objectifying "logics" merely as a consequence of being and surviving, 
irrespective of whether we are passionate supporters or vociferous opponents of 
capitalism's global hegemony.8 Human rights is no exception. As a core component 
of a liberal-democratic political order, human rights has (in varying ways) necessarily 
forged a relationship with the economic philosophy, practices, and institutions that 
accompany, if not establish, a liberal rights-based order. The relationship between 
human rights and capitalism more generally is unquestionably highly complex and 
multifaceted. While there are undoubtedly many within the human rights community 
who are wary of endorsing a human rights-based accommodation with capitalism, 
there are a great many examples of such endorsement, from both sides of the 
relationship. For example, human rights has been endorsed by many global financial 
institutional bodies, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 
both of which proudly proclaim the promotion of human rights as a central objective 
of their roles in regulating global trade and promoting economic growth.9 Similarly, 
many transnational corporations have endorsed a United Nations Global Compact, 
which provides a collection of Guiding Principles for how capitalist enterprises may 
be carried out in a human rights-compliant spirit and manner.10 Commercial 
enterprises that abide by these effectively unsupervised and legally unenforceable 
standards thereby receive a symbolic human rights-based stamp of approval. Those 
states within the UN human rights system that typically consider themselves to be 
most supportive of international human rights legal provisions and norms are also, of 
course, stalwart defenders of the market. It seems inconceivable for human rights to 
have achieved such a global presence and status had the international financial 
order and the more powerful constituents of that order found good cause and reason 
systematically to oppose human rights. In many significant respects, human rights 
has either always been amenable to the broad philosophy and practice of capitalism, 
or has adapted in order to ensure its own survival within such an order. Either way, 
there really is no doubt that an amenable relationship exists between the two, and 
many within the human rights community (and liberalism more broadly) have no 
objections to this state of affairs and positively approve of it. 
 
"Capitalism" is a ludicrously reductivist and falsely simplifying label for the profoundly 
complex and evolving set of realities to which it is applied. However, a great deal of 
discussion and debate has raged over what is typically described as the neoliberal 
manifestation of capitalism, which has exerted profound influence over politics, law, 
and society in recent decades, particularly within those societies in which 
demagoguery is also in ascendency. Defenders of neoliberalism credit it with 
delivering an extensive range of benefits as a consequence of its uncompromising 
commitment to expanding economies and economic growth. Individuals, who have 
not consistently opposed other manifestations of capitalism, have condemned and 
criticized neoliberalism for the rapidly growing economic inequalities it appears to 
produce as a consequence of removing external regulatory procedures and 
mechanisms previously developed to constrain what were thought to be "excessive" 
inequalities. In many parts of the developed and developing world, neoliberalism is 
strongly associated with declining public expenditure, shrinking welfare, and waning 
social support. It is also, particularly in some of the world's most affluent societies, 
strongly associated with rapidly expanding levels of socio-economic inequality. 
 
The modern human rights movement (conventionally dating back to the immediate 
post-World War II era) was not established under a neoliberal economic hegemony. 
Nor did the effectively universal support for some form of capitalism amongst the key 
constituents of the international financial, political, and legal orders exist, as is the 
case now. Some credit the establishment of social rights as human rights to this 
particular period, given the combined forces of the emerging European welfare state-
system within European liberal-democracies and the Soviet Union's opposition to 
capitalism and the market.11 However, social rights were never intended to pose a 
threat to those capitalist liberal democracies, which were prepared to support their 
inclusion within international human rights law. While this accommodation with 
capitalism seems unavoidable (if human rights were to secure such prominence 
within this order), it established a space in which this relationship would develop and 
complicate the practice of human rights. Specifically, it has more recently led to 
recognition of deep and wide-ranging affinities between human rights and 
neoliberalism. 
 
It may be surprising to many human rights supporters of social rights, in particular, to 
learn of the relationship between neoliberalism and human rights. However, there is 
an established body of academic scholarship that has identified numerous close 
connections between more recent manifestations of human rights and the philosophy 
and practice of neoliberalism. For example, in his analysis of the connections 
between neoliberalism and human rights, David Harvey writes, 
 
[T]he two movements are deeply implicated in each other. Undoubtedly, the neoliberal 
insistence upon the individual as the foundational element in politicaleconomic life opens the 
door to individual rights activism. But by focusing on those rights rather than on the creation or 
recreation of substantive and open democratic governance structures, the opposition cultivates 
methods that cannot escape the neoliberal frame.12 
 
Along with several others who have analyzed the affinities and connections between 
human rights and neoliberalism, Harvey argues that the institutionalized praxis of 
human rights draws upon a similar stock of ideals and commitments as 
neoliberalism: naïve individualism, the de-politicization of structural, systemic drivers 
of injustice, and an undue reliance placed upon the rule of law as the bulwark 
against the abuse of power.13 More recently, the historian Samuel Moyn has 
provided a meticulous analysis of the overlapping institutional and conceptual 
connections between neoliberalism and human rights since the late 1970s.14 For 
Moyn, the single greatest victim of this relationship has been an ever-declining 
support for the redistributive social democratic ideal of material equality, which he 
insists should be integral to the entire human rights project.15 The human rights 
community continues to include groups and individuals who seek to combat relative 
poverty and inequality, but Moyn insists they are a diminishing constituency with a 
declining presence and influence within the broader human rights movement and 
community.16 
 
It is reasonable to conclude that this body of research has correctly identified what 
should be a profoundly disturbing relationship for many within the human rights 
community. The research also offers important insights into the long-standing 
debates within the human rights community over the status of social rights, which 
continue to rage even now. However, this body of research has not addressed a 
puzzling question, which the relationship between neoliberalism and human rights 
raises. Human rights has been described by some human rights theorists as a 
"fighting creed."17 Human rights is typically conceived as offering a morally 
authoritative vehicle for combating injustices, such as deprivation, inequality, and 
marginalization. Many human rights supporters often simply assume that any 
commitment to human rights entails a corresponding commitment to social justice. 
Human rights appeals to many people precisely because it has a perception of being 
untarnished by partial interests and power. Therefore, why do so many who, to 
varying extents and in a variety of ways, identify with the cause of justice (itself 
variously conceived) nevertheless support forms of human rights that are, at the very 
least, closely entwined with neoliberalism? Why is the human rights community not 
concertedly and unequivocally opposed to neoliberalism? Why is the community not 
more uncompromisingly oppositional to the prevailing status quo? 
 
III THE GENTRIFICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS18 
 
Opponents of neoliberalism have a tendency towards demonizing those individuals 
and constituencies most closely associated with it. This is understandable. The self-
declared "masters of the universe" would have us all believe that they are the sole 
architects and exponents of a globalizing order, which financially rewards them so 
obscenely well. I shall refrain from demonization, however. The reality is that we all 
play our part in sustaining this order. What I refer to as the pernicious genius of 
neoliberalism reaches into the very forces that ostensibly oppose it. Neoliberalism 
assimilates elements of its potential opposition in the very form and substance that 
this ostensive opposition often assumes. The varying standpoints we adopt and the 
tools we deploy in our attempts to lead a good, equitable, humane life amidst 
profound inequalities and extensive social pathologies all too often either offer up no 
real opposition to the prevailing exploitative order or, unbeknownst to many, actually 
reinforce the deprivation, inequality, and marginalization it entails. Gentrification 
epitomizes this attempt to live wrong life rightly through its commodification of "good 
living."19 
 
Ruth Glass first coined the term "gentrification" and defined it as specifically denoting 
the residential redevelopment of previously working-class and industrialized urban 
neighborhoods.20 The phenomenon and thus the term which describes it is, however, 
so much more profound than the mere transformation of property ownership and use 
in areas such as the Bowery in New York, Docklands in London, the 10th 
Arrondissement in Paris, or Kreuzberg in Berlin. Far more significantly, gentrification 
is routinely depicted as a fundamentally progressive and transformative force, which 
exposes previously dark and dubious (if not downright dangerous) places to the light 
of liberal Modernity. As such, gentrification is defended not merely or exclusively as 
a housing market phenomenon, whose principal beneficiaries are developers, estate 
agents, property owners, mortgage providers, conveyancers, and chic retail outlets, 
but as part of a far more significant trend towards overcoming the past and 
refashioning the world for the better. Hence, the validity and need to engage with 
gentrification as a socially normative phenomenon has far wider implications for the 
societies in which it exists. 
 
Proponents typically defend gentrification, viewing it as being good, not just for those 
with the means and opportunity to inhabit the allegedly redeemed environments, but 
for everyone else as well. The inhabitants of many such neighborhoods used to live 
only amongst their "own kind" and all too often fell victim to the moribund, illiberal 
traditions and lifestyles of the urban deprived. Through this broad view, 
impoverishment obstructs the development of civic values and even of civil society 
itself. It produces and nourishes reactionary, sometimes brutalized, ways of being 
and believing. For those who defend it as a social and political good, gentrification 
offers the best (if not only) means of progressively transforming these 
neighborhoods. As well-educated, well-resourced, "responsible" (liberal) citizens 
take up their homes within these formerly dark places, they provide positive role 
models for the indigenous population to emulate. The neighborhoods become more 
liberal. Crime decreases and the streets are cleaner. As one academic supporter of 
gentrification declares, "gentrification rebalances a concentration of poverty by 
providing the tax base, rub-off work ethic, and political effectiveness of a middle-
class and in the process improves the quality of life for all a community's residents. It 
is the rising tide that lifts all boats."21 
 
Another academic endorsement of gentrification provides a more detailed and 
substantive account of its purported benefits to both the newly arrived and the long-
standing inhabitants of such neighborhoods. Thus, Peter Byrne contends that 
"gentrification is good on balance for the poor and ethnic minorities."22 He goes on to 
claim that gentrification benefits low-income residents economically, by "expanding 
employment opportunities in providing locally the goods and services that more 
affluent new residents can afford."23 Gentrification also heralds political benefits by 
creating "urban political fora in which affluent and poor citizens must deal with each 
other's priorities in a democratic process."24 Finally, Byrne credits gentrification with 
producing distinct social benefits as "[n]ew more affluent residents will rub shoulders 
with poorer existing residents on the streets, in shops, and within local institutions, 
such as public schools."25 The justifications for gentrification thereby burst the 
definitional boundaries of its narrow, original meaning. Gentrification is a means by 
which the moribund industrialized past can finally transcend, as well-resourced, 
liberally-motivated "progressives" strive to make the world a better place to live in.26 
It is important to note, at this point, that the socially normative dimension of 
gentrification ties social and even moral development to a system of market-based 
commercial transactions, which only some (the gentrified) have the means to 
participate in. Others (the non-gentrified) are thought nevertheless derivatively to 
benefit from this process. One might go so far as to say that gentrification (in both 
the narrow and broad understandings, which I draw upon in this article) is thought to 
"trickle down" to these others, who will, in time, come to emulate the values, norms, 
and commitments of their wealthier, allegedly progressive, neighbors. 
 
As I previously stated, gentrification must be understood in its broader, socially 
normative sense if we are to understand its appeal for many and its wider social and 
political significance. This broader conception of gentrification comprises a collection 
of dispositional values that have been associated with the emergence of a new 
social demographic referred to as the "radical new middle classes," which began to 
attract sustained academic attention from the 1970s onwards.27 The chronology is 
particularly pertinent, since it closely corresponds with the acceleration of 
gentrification (in the narrower sense), while also paralleling the period when human 
rights began to attract far greater attention and interest amongst particular social 
groups within what many now refer to as post-industrial societies.28 As I shall 
proceed to demonstrate, the radical new middle classes are a highly significant 
constituent of the human rights community within post-industrial societies and 
understanding the defining attributes of this constituency is essential to the account I 
shall present of that community's character and standing. 
 
Growing out of the categorization of modern, complex societies as "post-industrial," 
the post-materialist thesis rests upon a number of claims, two of which are central.29 
The first is that within affluent, post-industrial societies, the arduous struggle for 
basic survival has been achieved. The post-war economic boom and sustained 
growth have lifted everyone, even the poorest, out of abject poverty and life-
threatening deprivation. As one of the principal authors of post-materialism stated: 
"[i]n short, people are safe and they have enough to eat."30 In addition, and 
particularly within those post-industrial societies with established public welfare 
systems, people have secure access to a range of core forms of protection and 
provision, such as rising levels of education (and educational attainment), legally-
secured entitlements to health-care and social security, unemployment provision, 
and financial support in times of individual need, such as illness, accident, or 
disability. The second core claim is that the struggle against capitalism is over.31 
Progressive political forces within post-industrialized societies no longer seek to 
oppose or even overcome this emerging new form of postindustrialized capitalism, 
but instead, pursue an increasingly eclectic set of political interests and objectives 
made possible by it, from environmentalism, the peace movement, and animal rights, 
to human rights.32 Politics is no longer constrained by binary class distinctions and 
their dependence upon crude instrumental rationality.33 
 
The embodiment of this new set of dispositional values was evident in the rise of 
radical new middle classes and the so-called new social movements, which some 
formed, many participated in, and even more identified with. Feeling as though they 
had been liberated from the bonds of wealth-fixated interests and concerns, many 
amongst the new middle classes were able to focus on what they increasingly 
considered to be inherently moral or humanitarian causes, as opposed to more 
overtly partial, political interests. As an early observer wrote of members of the anti-
nuclear arms movement, they "tend to be far less oriented to the achievement of 
economic or material rewards for their supporters. They are instead more typically 
concerned with issues of a moral or humanitarian nature."34 The widespread desire 
to ennoble one's economic standing by creating or associating with morally or 
culturally distinguished symbols and causes has long been practiced amongst the 
"older" middle classes, or bourgeoisie, if you prefer a more overtly Marxist 
designation.35 The new middle classes transform this long-standing practice into a 
veritable raison d'etre, as a whole body of empirical research repeatedly highlights 
the importance of liberal, identity-constituting commitments and causes for many 
amongst the new middle classes.36 
 
It is also debatable how many typically well-educated, materially secure individuals 
may be prepared to accept the continuing reference to being middle class, new, or 
otherwise. Since, in addition to the diminished interest in the politics of wealth and 
capital, many members of the new social movements are recognizable by their 
commitment to a largely liberal-individualist set of post-materialist values and a 
corresponding absence of any consciousness of themselves as belonging to a class: 
they are marked by their lack of any sustained consciousness of being a class in and 
of themselves.37 Indeed, subjective class-based interests have become increasingly 
obsolete. As Inglehart stressed, post-materialists are identifiable by their rejection of 
class-based politics and political parties.38 Many amongst the new middle classes 
favor political parties and causes considered liberal and progressive.39 Their very 
"radicalism" lies in their ability to perceive the need to both experiment with living and 
establish alternatives to the fast-expiring moribund appeal of traditional socialist or 
workers-based parties and movements. Alvin Gouldner expresses this clearly when 
he states that the new class "is a center of whatever human emancipation is possible 
in the foreseeable future."40 Indeed, Gouldner speculated that the radical new middle 
classes represent "the best card that history has presently given us to play."41 
 
IV HOW DOES THIS ALL CONNECT TO THE GENTRIFICATION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS? 
 
There are many different strands and aspects to what I term the gentrification of 
human rights. Several are particularly important to my ensuing line of analysis and 
argument. Thus, the gentrification of human rights refers to the widespread 
displacement of what was an underdeveloped human rightsbased engagement with 
deprivation, inequality, and social marginalization within so-called post-industrialist 
societies. The gentrification of human rights generally and characteristically fails to 
concertedly identify and effectively engage with systemic and structurally based 
forms of injustice. A gentrified approach to human rights within such societies fails to 
identify and engage with fundamental forms of social and economic injustice 
precisely because it is itself a product of these systemic and structural forces: it is 
part of the very predicament it largely fails to discern. The liberal individualism that is 
central to the gentrification of human rights is infused with a set of presuppositions 
concerning the basis and causes of what is often construed as constituting success 
and failure within post-materialist societies. It is often simply assumed that many 
individuals thrive or languish largely as a consequence of their own dispositions, 
commitments, and lifestyle choices, rather than as a result of partially motivated 
structures, policies, and laws. 
 
The gentrification of human rights is also characterized by a set of assumptions 
about the nature of the post-materialist societies which support it, and which coincide 
with a set of assumptions and presuppositions concerning the extent to which the 
relative inequalities found within such affluent, "liberal" societies may be legitimately 
considered as severe or serious enough to justify describing them as human rights 
violations. There have been repeated attempts by influential theorists and 
practitioners to defend the normative legitimacy of human rights by seeking to pare 
down their content and scope.42 Insisting that so-called "human rights inflationism" 
serves to undermine the impartiality and moral authority of the doctrine, human rights 
supporters have been repeatedly urged, by those wary of what they see as overly-
ambitious normative objectives, to focus on only the worst forms of "inhumanity," in 
which only life-threatening socio-economic harms may be included.43 Of course, not 
everyone has accepted such a counsel of restraint. However, the sentiment, which it 
draws upon and evokes, is a well-established component of many peoples' 
understanding of what human rights is, or should be. By connecting it to the 
specifically post-materialist component of the gentrification of human rights, we can 
see how it reinforces a view that relative inequalities and poverty are no longer 
morally compelling within societies where, to repeat the above quotation, "people are 
safe and they have enough to eat."44 
 
Moving on from this claim about the satisfaction of basic needs within post-
materialist societies, the gentrification of human rights also rests upon a set of 
presuppositions and assumptions about the extent to which affluent, liberal societies, 
while not perfect, nevertheless are at their core essentially just. Thus, human rights 
are characteristically associated with universal moral principles of justice, fairness, 
and basic equity. Societies, in which respect for human rights is considered an 
integral part of the legal order and the public and civic culture, may thereby be 
considered societies whose basic structures are sufficiently just and fair. A human 
rights-respecting society, it seems to follow, is not one in which the basic rules and 
procedures governing public authorities' regulation of individual enterprise (in the 
broad sense of that term) are fundamentally rigged or discriminatory towards any 
section of society. This is not to say that individual violations may sometimes occur, 
as they undeniably do: a defining component of most liberal political philosophies is 
the claim that no society or order can ever be perfectly just. However, exceptional 
injustices do occur and when they do, there exist distinctly legal remedies (if the 
society is sufficiently human rights-respecting), which will provide individual redress 
and compensation. There may be all sorts of things that many of us dislike about our 
human rights-respecting societies, but these supervene the fundamental assumption 
that the extent to which those societies are basically just is confirmed by the extent 
to which they, generally speaking, legally uphold and respect human rights 
commitments.45 To conclude that one's own society adequately respects human 
rights, where human rights are the dominant political idiom for what constitutes 
"justice" and "fairness," dispels any deeper anxieties about the possible need for 
fundamental, radical change. Violations which occur, are considered exceptional and 
not endemic or characteristic.46 The system is not rigged against those who fare 
badly within it. In keeping with the post-materialist values of the gentrified, and by 
dint of an evident circularity in reasoning, the existence of human rights provides 
basic reassurance that the "grand narrative" types of political conflict and struggle 
are over. We may thereby focus on the more personal, lifestyle-type concerns, which 
the human rights framework ensures that everyone can enjoy. In human rights-
respecting, liberal-democratic, and sufficiently affluent societies, human rights exist 
to the extent that (almost everyone) enjoys an opportunity of leading a minimally 
"good" life. Beyond this threshold, what individuals make of their lives is a matter of 
concern only to them as sufficiently free agents. 
 
Finally, and following on the end of the grand narrative political struggle, a gentrified 
approach to human rights largely supports the post-materialist view that the struggle 
against capitalism is over. Those who dispute the alleged inevitability of capitalism 
are susceptible to being dismissed as unduly infected by partial (orthodox Marxist) 
ideology. "Genuine" progressives, in contrast, accept that the key challenge consists 
of determining the type of capitalism we would prefer our societies be characterized 
by. Thus, even some of those individuals who are anxious about the harmful effects 
of capitalism typically counsel the need to contain and ameliorate capitalism where 
these harms cross the human rights threshold.47 
 
 
V INEQUALITY, THE PRECARIAT, AND A CASE IN POINT: GRENFELL 
 
It would be churlish to deny that the period of neoliberalism within affluent liberal-
democratic societies has not witnessed significant social, legal, and material 
developments. Most significantly for many human rights supporters, has been the 
extension of what Kathryn Sikkink refers to as "recognition rights" to a diverse 
rainbow alliance of various groups who lacked any effective form of legal protections 
against the systematic discrimination and persecutions they previously suffered.48 In 
addition to specific rights successes, there is also no denying that the human rights 
movement rose to global prominence during a period coinciding with neoliberalism. 
As a result, more people became aware that they were, in some sense, endowed 
with human rights. In some instances, this knowledge fueled and supported 
campaigns to secure legal rights where they had been denied. Further, countless 
political leaders have repeatedly lauded the virtues of economic growth and the 
expansion of economic opportunities as core objectives of responsible governments. 
Those who have sought to continue defending some forms of state welfare programs 
have repeatedly stressed the necessity of economic growth as the means of 
supporting the range of welfare services funded by the state to provide for those who 
have not been able to share in the purported benefits of neoliberal-induced growth. 
Finally, the gentrification of previously rundown and deprived swathes of many urban 
and suburban neighborhoods stand as architectural monuments to neoliberal 
"regeneration." 
 
There is also a far darker side to these developments. While some economists 
identify neoliberalism with the fastest growing material inequalities in human history, 
others have documented the emergence of decidedly ungentrified social groups, 
which bear the greatest brunt of this rising inequality. Thus, Guy Standing coined the 
term the "precariat" to designate a rapidly expanding social demographic that is 
chiefly characterized by the precariousness of its existence and that lives in chronic 
conditions of insecurity.49 Standing seeks to identify the distinct socio-economic 
suffering of an expanding constituency of people residing in some of the most 
affluent societies on earth.50 The precariat is a large and growing constituency, 
including the young, the old, the frail, the chronically ill and disabled, migrant 
workers, refugees and asylum seekers, the unemployed, the many in employment 
but on zero contract hours, and many others who may not yet be considered bona 
fide members of this unenviable constituency but for whom the loss of an 
increasingly insecure livelihood might result in them becoming "precariatized."51 
 
Regardless of how we socially classify them, there are also very large numbers of 
people exposed to severe forms of deprivation, inequality, and marginalization in 
some of the wealthiest, most neoliberal societies on earth. As a recent UN report into 
the extent of poverty and inequality in the US demonstrated, some 40 million 
Americans live in poverty.52 The youth poverty rate in the US is the highest within the 
OECD and the US ranks 36 out of 37 for access to water and sanitation.53 Tropical 
diseases and parasites such as Zika and hookworm are increasingly prevalent in 
some areas of the southern United States.54 Philip Alston, the author of the report 
and the current UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights stated: 
 
the United States is alone among developed countries in insisting that while human rights are 
of fundamental importance, they do not include rights that guard against dying of hunger, dying 
from a lack of access to affordable healthcare, or growing up in a context of total deprivation.55 
Interestingly, Alston focused his report on the effects that poverty exerts on many 
Americans' enjoyment of their civil and political rights in recognition of the United 
States refusal to ratify the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights.56 One might therefore conclude that the United States' narrow construal of 
the definition of human rights makes it an inappropriate case study for any argument 
concerning the ineffectiveness of more comprehensive human rights protection to 
combat the effects of inequality. It would therefore be better to examine examples of 
states that have both endorsed a range of comprehensive human rights instruments 
and where the precariat exists in large numbers. The United Kingdom provides a 
perfect example. 
 
Almost all (if not all) post-industrial, neoliberal societies contain a highly established, 
legally-enshrined human rights infrastructure, comprising an extensive body of 
positive law and distinct institutions. The United Kingdom is exemplary in this 
respect.57 The UK is party to all of the core UN human rights covenants. It is similarly 
bound by the terms of the European Convention on Human Rights and the European 
Social Charter. There exists, for the moment at least, the UK Human Rights Act and 
a UK parliamentary human rights committee. The UK has an independent human 
rights commission and a well-established and varied human rights NGO sector. The 
UK ticks most, if not all, of the institutional human rights boxes. And yet, the UK has 
also been experiencing growing levels of inequality. Significant parts of the UK 
population are exposed to and suffering from increasing levels of deprivation, 
inequality, and marginalization. A select sample of indicators illustrates this growing 
inequality. 
 
The "UK is the seventh most unequal" society within the OECD.58 In the UK, the 
richest 10 percent of the population owns 45 percent of the nation's wealth, while the 
poorest 50 percent owns 8.7 percent of the wealth.59 A quarter of all children in the 
UK live in poverty.60 Additionally, 1.6 million pensioners live in poverty.61 Over 5 
million adults are functionally illiterate and UK teenagers are the most illiterate and 
innumerate within the OECD countries.62 Between April 2016 and March 2017, 
Trussell Foodbank distributed over 1 million emergency three-day food parcels to 
people who could not afford to feed themselves or their families.63 Figures from the 
Office for National Statistics show that malnutrition was the underlying cause or a 
contributory factor in 391 deaths in NHS hospitals in England and Wales in 2016.64 
In light of these statistics, the post-materialist claim that poverty no longer kills 
people in post-industrialized societies holds no weight. 
 
Levels of deprivation, inequality, and marginalization have been growing rapidly 
since the late 1970s in the UK. For the most part, successive governments have 
either largely ignored this phenomenon, or tended towards characterizing it in terms 
that both stigmatize the victims and lends support to a policy approach marked by 
greater restrictions and conditions in the provision of welfare benefits.65 Political 
discourse regarding the existence of poverty and inequality within the UK has both 
shaped and reflected a wider depiction of welfare claimants as being either bogus, or 
in some sense ultimately responsible for their needs, expecting others to then 
support and provide for them. 
 
This narrative, while still prevalent, was shaken and partially disrupted by a 
particularly shocking tower block fire in a social housing estate in west London: the 
Grenfell Tower fire, which occurred on the night of 14 June 2017. Grenfell Tower 
was a twenty-four-storey social housing tower block situated on a larger social 
housing estate, many of whose residents would fall into Standing's category of the 
precariat. A domestic fire occurred in one of the flats and within a very short period of 
time, quickly engulfed the entire block. The rapid spread of the fire was largely due to 
the highly flammable cladding, which had recently been installed as part of a wider 
"modernizing" refurbishment. The official death toll reached seventy-one.66 Following 
the Grenfell conflagration, 259 other similar tower blocks across the UK have failed 
fire stress tests.67 
 
The horrendous event, which was the Grenfell Tower fire, terribly exemplifies a far 
darker side to gentrification in both the narrow and broader sense of the term. 
Grenfell is located in one of the wealthiest residential neighborhoods in the world. 
The average price of an apartment in the Royal London Borough of Kensington and 
Chelsea was over £1.5 million in 2016. A semi-detached house in the borough costs 
over £6 million. A wall separates part of the estate from its private owner-occupied 
properties found in the same area. It was not always this way. Large areas of the 
borough were previously inhabited by mostly working-class residents, but 
gentrification has spread rapidly and most of the former inhabitants have left, as 
social housing estates, like the one Grenfell was situated on, have given way to 
private residential expansion. In some cases, the government has made limited 
provision for social housing tenants in newly built residential complexes. However, in 
many of these, the social housing and so-called market-value residents have 
separate entrances to the very same building, effectively segregating the poor from 
the better off. These segregated entrances have been dubbed "poor doors."68 
 
Given the demographics of Grenfell, it is not surprising that many have come to view 
it as a symbol of life-threatening inequality in the UK.69 In contrast, others have 
sought to represent the fire as a tragedy whose significance and meaning only 
extends to the victims and their families.70 This view typically focuses on the need for 
an inquiry and, if necessary, the launching of criminal corporate manslaughter 
charges against Kensington Borough Council and the private tenant management 
organization that managed the block for the council.71 In this way, an attempt is 
made to individuate and de-politicize Grenfell and to divert attention away from 
situating its victims in a broader socio-economic and socio-political context, which 
affects vast swathes of the UK.72 One might expect this tactic from those who have 
distinct and partial political interests in seeking to deny the existence and extent of 
structural and systemic inequality within the UK. What one might not have expected 
is that, in its immediate response to Grenfell, much of the UK human rights 
community, where it commented at all, similarly ignored its political significance. 
Thus, Amnesty International UK (with 7 million members worldwide) made no 
statement at all on Grenfell. Liberty called for a thorough public inquiry, adequate 
provision of legal aid, and a speedy return of residents to their community.73 The 
Equality and Human Rights Commission published a blog, which mentioned Grenfell 
in espousing the importance of economic and social rights within the UK, before 
insisting that a key objective of any post-Brexit settlement must be "to retain and 
strengthen rights in UK law and to keeping Britain's long track record of fairness 
intact."74 Human Rights Watch also blogged on the issue and similarly focused on 
the redress aspect of the fire, by stating that "the government must ensure effective 
independent investigations into the causes of the deaths in the fire, with appropriate 
remedies, including criminal accountability, compensation for victims, and necessary 
changes to laws and policies."75 Finally, Rights Info continued the blogging response 
theme and insisted that the private contractors should have sought to comply with 
the aforementioned UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.76 
 
The UK human rights community's general response to Grenfell echoes its general 
lack of engagement with neoliberalism and the plight of the precariat.77 As such, it 
confirms many of the core components of the gentrification of human rights, which I 
presented above. It fails to consider the possibility that the plight of the precariat may 
be due to structural and systemic forms of inequality. It even, in the words of the 
Equality and Human Rights Commission blogger, reaffirms a belief that the UK is 
basically a fair and just society.78 Similarly, the community makes no attempt to 
consider the possible effects of gentrification (in the narrow sense) on Grenfell spe-
cifically, and the conditions under which many other social housing tenants live.79 
Liberty's call for residents to be returned speedily to their community may be well 
intentioned, but entirely ignores the deprived conditions of the communities to which 
they would be returned. Most of the respondents made recommendations that 
merely reinforced the existing institutions and none questioned whether, for example, 
a right of individual legal remedy or redress might fall far short of addressing the 
collective, systemic challenges of deprivation, inequality, and marginalization in the 
UK. The present institutions might just be part of the problem and not the solution. 
Finally, the various organizations made no comment about the socio-economic class 
aspect of the plight of the precariat and the victims of Grenfell especially. The British 
government conducted an independent inquiry into the fire, although the local 
residents' association repeatedly criticized the terms of that inquiry for excluding the 
broader socioeconomic context of Grenfell. The burnt-out building remains and there 
can be little doubt that Grenfell disrupted the relentlessly critical narrative that sought 
to blame the poor for their own plight. However, there have been no systematic 
policy proposals to identify and begin to seek to overcome the far wider extent of 
deprivation, inequality, and marginalization within the UK. Grenfell symbolizes this 
wider state of deprivation, inequality, and marginalization. 
 
VI HAVING THE COURAGE TO ENGAGE IN AN ATTACK ON ONE'S 
CONVICTIONS: DE-GENTRIFYING HUMAN RIGHTS? 
 
I have argued that the ability of human rights to genuinely and concertedly confront 
the systemic and structural causes of increasing deprivation, inequality, and 
marginalization has been severely restricted by what I have termed the gentrification 
of human rights. Human rights rose to become the dominant political idiom for many 
within notionally liberal-democratic societies as a consequence, in part, of the 
community's general failure to identify and challenge the pervasive harms which 
neoliberalism has entailed. The human rights community, as I have been using that 
term throughout, may be understood not so much as directly supporting 
neoliberalism, but as failing to robustly and concertedly challenge it. The prevailing 
failure of human rights is one of omission, rather than commission. However, the 
effects of this failure have been amplified as a consequence of the doctrine's status 
as the predominant political idiom, or discourse, of social justice within affluent, 
liberal-democratic societies.80 As others have argued, the sheer degree of faith 
placed in human rights by many who identify it with the pursuit of social justice has 
hegemonically restricted our collective engagement with the deeper causes of 
deprivation, inequality, and marginalization. In their gentrified form, in particular, 
human rights have more often than not restricted the political imagination to a series 
of provisions that largely reinforce the deeper causes of so much injustice. On its 
face, depicting human rights as "gentrified" in the ways I have done in this article 
could support a remorselessly critical analysis of human rights as providing nothing 
more than an ideological alibi for constituencies of people whose social conditions 
depend upon the systemically hierarchical relationships, which gentrification both 
depends upon but simultaneously seeks to deny. That is not my intention here. 
Critique need not be crudely adversarial or thoroughly oppositional. 
 
Despite this, and given the strong tendency within the human rights community 
generally towards rejecting all forms of critical engagement, many within the human 
rights community are liable to disagree and perhaps even take offence at my 
characterization of significant components of human rights as gentrified within 
affluent, "liberal-democratic" societies. Many will direct me towards the existence of 
an extensive body of social rights, which many human rights defenders have 
dedicated their work to developing and promoting. Even some prominent critics of 
the failures of human rights to effectively protect and promote material equality, such 
as Moyn for example, also identify social rights as the means by which human rights 
may begin to confront its limitations and overcome its embarrassing entanglement 
with neoliberalism.81 There can be no question that the defense of social rights has 
much to commend it, particularly perhaps given the sheer extent and depth of social 
inequalities in otherwise such affluent societies. The bold and uncompromising 
country reports produced by the present UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty 
and human rights offer an example of the contribution that human rights can make to 
denounce the precariatization of affluent societies.82 Similarly, Grenfell has coincided 
with a renewed interest in social rights amongst sections of human rights academia 
and the NGO sector in the UK.83 In this regard, human rights can best detach itself 
from its complicity with neoliberalism by pivoting towards social democratic principles 
and aligning itself with that category of rights which neoliberalism appears so 
adamantly to oppose. 
 
In immediately pragmatic terms, a greater interest in and support for social rights is, I 
believe, to be welcomed by all of those within the human rights community who are 
genuinely and deeply aggrieved by rising inequality. However, I doubt that even this 
will enable the community to genuinely de-gentrify itself. Alston's damning report of 
extreme poverty in the US was summarily dismissed by the current US 
administration and even accused of overt political bias. The report may have 
energized some community activists who are struggling against pervasive poverty 
and destitution in many parts of the US (which could be a beneficial consequence) 
but it is not going to change the core policy commitments of an administration that 
continues to claim that the US is a "world leader" in defending human rights.84 By 
itself, mere outrage at others' plight offers little, if any, effective means for 
overcoming the injustices to which individuals are most exposed. Similarly, individual 
compensation and redress for the victims of the Grenfell fire will, in itself, yield little 
or no beneficial consequences for the many people for whom homelessness is the 
only alternative to continuing to live on social housing estates separated by real and 
metaphorical walls from their owneroccupier private counterparts. 
 
Most certainly in respect to the manner of their application, and quite possibly in 
respect to their very formulation, social rights are only capable of providing 
contingent, ameliorative, and palliative redress and thereby leave intact the very 
relationships of inequality and profound unfairness that gave rise to them in the first 
place.85 The recipients of social rights become, perhaps inevitably, "patients" of 
liberal, human rights concern, a relationship based upon terms of exchange, which 
all too quickly and on too many occasions, succumbs to all of the contradictions of 
any such form of noblesse oblige.86 
 
There is an urgent need for the doctrine and the community to de-gentrify if human 
rights is to genuinely stake a claim to a deserved status of being a key political idiom 
for social justice in these times of rapidly increasing deprivation, inequality, and 
marginalization. A mere acknowledgement of the validity of the social rights 
entitlements by the "have-nots" in our societies, which does not radically engage with 
the deeper conditions that produce both the integral relationships between the 
"haves" and the "have-nots," will provide superficial redress at best. 
 
There is an even more immediate need for the human rights community to both 
acknowledge its own gentrification and to engage in the task of overcoming it: the 
increasing electoral hostility directed towards human rights within those societies in 
which demagoguery, the crack cocaine of contemporary politics, is on the rise. It 
would be absurdly reductivist to attribute all of the rising popularity of demagoguery 
to liberalism's failure to effectively engage with the deprivation, inequality, and 
marginalization to which neoliberalism, in particular, has contributed. Voters are 
drawn towards demagoguery for a diverse set of "reasons" and ostensive interests. It 
is also understandable why, given the overwhelmingly illiberal and intolerant 
character of so much of demagoguery, so many liberal human rights supporters 
would prefer to label these as "deplorable" and refuse to engage with them. I have 
already insisted that, in a notional democracy, any such summarily dismissive 
attitudes towards fellow voters and citizens are pragmatically ill-advised. However, 
as this article has sought to identify and unpack, the human rights community's 
growing unpopularity amongst many electorates, where human rights were thought 
(by the human rights community) to be secure, may be considered a consequence of 
the failure to engage with the conditions that demagogues have come to exploit for 
their own purposes. It is easy to depict liberalism as having failed many, precisely 
because it has failed so many. The atavistic and self-destructive appeal of 
authoritarian demagogues is, in part, a reaction to the hubristic failure of 
gentrification to be the tide that lifts all boats, to repeat the imagery I considered 
earlier.87 The human rights community has a profound interest in disassociating itself 
from such prejudices and false assumptions, not just because this is pragmatically 
advisable within electoral democracies, but because there is an urgent need to 
develop and disseminate a radical political response to demagoguery. If human 
rights is to play an important role in this movement, it will have to recognize the need 
for radical change.88 In part, the human rights community's reaction to critiques such 
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